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INTRODUCTION
For five years, Robert Colavito suffered from end-stage renal disease for
which he was placed on a kidney transplant waiting list.' On August 21, 2002,
Colavito's longtime friend, Peter Lucia, died of intracranial bleeding. Lucia's
widow decided to donate both of his kidneys to Colavito. Lucia's left kidney
was air-lifted to a Miami hospital. But contrary to his widow's wishes, the right
kidney remained in New York, in the custody of the New York Organ Donor
Network (NYODN).2 On August 23, 2002, Colavito was fully prepared for
surgery3 when Dr. George Burke, his surgeon, discovered that the donated left
kidney was irreparably damaged, and therefore useless for transplantation.
When a member of Burke's staff called the NYODN to request the second
kidney for Colavito's use, he was told that it already had been transplanted into
another patient. 4 Subsequent tests indicated that both of Lucia's kidneys were
incompatible with Colavito's antibodies, so neither could have been
transplanted successfully.
5
Colavito filed suit in federal court against the NYODN and individual
doctors involved in the kidney disposition. He claimed the defendants were
liable for fraud, conversion, and violation of New York Public Health Law. The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing
Colavito's fraud claim on the merits, and finding that he could not sustain a
common law action for conversion or a claim based on New York Public
Health Law.6 Colavito appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed with respect
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2009; Harvard University, A.B. 2006. The author wishes to
thank Professor Robert Ellickson, Professor Henry Hansmann, and Professor Peter Schuck for advice on
sources, as well as Benjamin Shultz and Wally Adeyemo for insightful comments and editing.
1. Linda Delmonico Prussen, Organ Owners: LI. Families Force Courts To Decide Who Owns
Our Body Parts, LONG ISLAND PRESS, July 21, 2005, http://www.longislandpress.com/
?cp=40&show=article&a id=4954.
2. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 2006).
3. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
4. Colavito, 438 F.3dat218.
5. Id. at 219.
6. Colavito, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
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to Colavito's fraud claim.7 However, the court reserved judgment on the
conversion and Public Health Law claims, determining that both raised novel
and important questions of New York law. As a result, the Second Circuit
certified several questions to the New York Court of Appeals, including:
(1) Do the applicable provisions of the New York Public Health Law vest the
intended recipient of a directed organ donation with rights that can be
vindicated in a private party's lawsuit sounding in the common law tort of
conversion or through a private right of action inferred from the New York
Public Health Law?
(2) Does New York Public Health Law immunize either negligent or grossly
negligent misconduct?
8
The New York Court of Appeals responded, concluding that "a specified
donee of an incompatible kidney.., has no common law right to the organ"
9
because, under New York law, "there is no common law property right in a
dead body." 10 The court also determined that Colavito could not recover under
New York Public Health Law because section 4302(4) only authorizes donors
to make a gift to "any specified donee, for therapy or transplantation needed by
him." 11 While "he was in need of a functioning kidney, both of Peter's kidneys
were of no use to [Colavito]. 12 The court thus found that Colavito had no
cause of action because Lucia's kidney was medically incompatible. But the
Court of Appeals left open the possibility that, when a donated organ is
medically compatible, New York Public Health Law might define a cause of
action for the intended organ recipient (donee) for its improper disposition.
This Comment argues that there are sound policy justifications for allowing
an intended organ donee to have a cause of action if several caveats are
accounted for. Part I briefly outlines the scientific and legal background
regarding human organ transplants. Part II explains that a donee's cause of
action could be superior to a donor's cause of action under narrowly defined
circumstances, because the donee's greater material stake in the organ's proper
disposition makes her more likely to effectively enforce that outcome. The
conclusion proposes several liability exceptions, and discussing why a donee's
cause of action is of growing importance, based on current trends in organ
transplantation.
7. Colavito, 438 F.3d at 216.
8. Id. at 216-17. The Second Circuit certified a third question as well: "If a donee can bring a
private action to enforce the rights referred to in question 1, may the plaintiff recover nominal or
punitive damages without demonstrating pecuniary loss or other actual injury?" Id. at 217.
9. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., No. 106, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 3655, at *16 (N.Y.
Dec. 14, 2006). Robert Colavito died in June 2006, so his widow, Patricia Colavito, served as his
personal representative for the remainder of the case.
10. Id. at *14-15.
11. Id. at *24 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at *25.
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I. BACKGROUND
Donated organs include vital organs (e.g., the heart, the stomach) and
nonvital organs that can be removed from the donor without causing death by
their absence (e.g., one kidney, a section of the liver),)3 Human organ donation
can be accomplished through cadaveric donors of either vital or nonvital
organs, or living donors, who are only permitted to donate nonvital organs.
14
Organs are donated to anonymous recipients through the national waiting list
15
or to recipients specified by the donor or her next-of-kin in a process known as
"directed donation."'
16
Approximately 96,000 people are on the national waiting list for organ
transplantation.17 Thousands more await tissue transplantation.18 The demand
for transplants far outpaces the supply. Between January and November of
2006, only 28,923 transplants were performed. 19 Each day, an average of
seventeen people in the United States die waiting for transplants. Those who
survive require expensive treatment.
2 1
Under most states' common law, "next of kin have a 'quasi-property' right
in the decedent's body for purposes of burial or other lawful disposition. ' 22 But
the narrow definition of this quasi-property right 23 has led courts and
commentators to suggest that it is actually "a legal fiction created to enable
relatives to recover for the tort of mental distress." 24 Several cases interpret this
13. Gloria J. Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 53 (1995).
14. Id.
15. See42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2) (2000).
16. LifeGift.org, Donors & Recipients, http://www.lifegift.org/DirectedDonation.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2007).
17. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Waiting List Candidates,
http://www.optn.org/data/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter OPTN, Waiting List Candidates].
18. New York Organ Donor Network, Overview, http://www.nyodn.org/organ/o-statistics_
overview.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter NYODN, Overview].
19. OPTN, Waiting List Candidates, supra note 17.
20. NYODN, Overview, supra note 18.
21. Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe Unto Those Who Request Consent. Ethical and Legal Considerations
in Rejecting a Deceased's Anatomical Gift Because There is No Consent by the Survivors, 78 N.D. L.
REV. 323, 343 (2002) (estimating that replacing dialysis with kidney transplants in one thousand cases
would produce taxpayer savings of $500 million over a twenty-year period).
22. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991). This quasi-property right is of
relatively recent vintage. For many years, English and U.S. courts declined to recognize common law
property interests in dead bodies or body parts. See Amy S. Pignatella Cain, Note, Property Rights in
Human Biological Materials: Studies in Species Reproduction and Biomedical Technology, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 449, 451 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (declining to extend the "quasi-
property" interest to "all of the body's organs"); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 341 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (finding a property right existed ordinarily only for purposes of burial); Pierce v.
Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242 (1872) (noting that "certain persons may have rights" (emphasis
added)).
24. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 385 (2000).
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right to allow next-of-kin to sue for improper harvesting of a decedent's organs;
some cases even find the right to be of constitutional dimension.25 But these
cases all address the right to prevent medical personnel from harvesting organs
from dead relatives, not to require such personnel to harvest and allocate them
according to the donor's wishes. Courts have also significantly constrained
common law property rights of a person to her own body parts. For example,
several courts have decided that common law does not support a tort claim of
conversion for the research use of a patient's tissue without her permission.26
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1968 and its 1987 revision,
which regulate cadaveric donation and have been adopted in some form in all
fifty states and the District of Columbia,27 permit a donor's (or her next-of-
kin's) cause of action when her organs are harvested beyond the scope of
consent.28 However, the UAGA's "good faith" immunity provision often
protects medical personnel. 29 The UAGA may provide grounds for a donor to
sue when physicians cause the donated organ to be used for a purpose other
than her specified purpose of transplantation, although, again, physicians may
be excused from liability for good faith.30
The donee's right to sue seems mostly confined to medical malpractice
cases in which she experiences harmful treatment at the hands of the
transplanting surgeon. 31 But a few cases and statutes suggest another donee's
cause of action: for improper disposition of the organ. For example, the UAGA
states, "The rights of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the rights
of others . ,32 Additionally, an Indiana court reserved judgment on the issue
of whether an intended donee had a protectable liberty interest in receiving a
promised organ.33 And Ohio explicitly defines a donee's property right in the
25. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796 (9th Cir. 2002); Brotherton, 923 F.2d at
482. But see Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985).
26. See Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (E.D. Mo. 2006); Greenberg v.
Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Moore v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).
27. Banks, supra note 13, at 66; Rhonda Gay Hartman, Face Value: Challenges of Transplant
Technology, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 11 (2005). Another revision of the UAGA was released on October
13, 2006, but it has not yet gained widespread adoption. AnatomicalGiftAct.Org, Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (2006), http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex= I &tabid=63.
28. See, e.g., Perry v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563-64 (D. Kan.
1995); Sattler v. Nw. Tissue Ctr., 42 P.3d 440, 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
29. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ala. Eye Bank, 727 So. 2d 62, 64 (Ala. 1999); Ramirez v. Health Partners
of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); Schembre v. Mid-Am. Transplant Assoc., 135
S.W.3d 527, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
30. See Carey v. New Eng. Organ Bank, 843 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (Mass. 2006).
31. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Katz, No. 2005-00217, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 358, at *11 (Mass.
Super. Ct. July 14, 2006); Ravenis v. Detroit Gen. Hosp., 234 N.W.2d 411,414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
32. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UAGA) § 2(e) (1968) (amended 1987).
33. Martin v. Kim, No. 2:03cv536, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20595, at *17 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 19,
2005).
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anatomical gift, although the only remedy provided is a declaratory judgment.3 4
Indeed, the importance of Colavito is that "[no] court has [yet] held that an
intended recipient has any right in a donated organ or tissue prior to the
completion of the gift," that is, prior to "actual transplantation into the
recipient."
35
1I. POLICY REASONING SUPPORTING A DONEE'S CAUSE OF ACTION
Colavito illustrates how medical personnel may disregard or even flout a
donor's wishes by transplanting an organ into someone other than the intended
donee. Physicians have even transplanted organs into the wrong individuals in
other, more appalling instances.36 Individual states may react to these cases by
more closely monitoring or regulating the organ transplantation process or by
providing a private cause of action for improper organ disposition.37 States
should consider a donee's cause of action because it would be more effective
than a donor's cause of action in enforcing proper organ disposition.
A. Competing Interests
In creating a private cause of action, a state is likely to balance the same
sort of competing interests underlying the UAGA. Those include "the wishes of
the deceased during [her] lifetime concerning the disposition of [her] body...
the desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin" 38 and "the need of society for
bodies, tissues and organs for medical education, research, therapy and
transplantation." 39 To apply to living as well as cadaveric donors, these
interests seem best summarized as "donor's wishes," "donor's agent's wishes,
if donor's wishes cannot be ascertained,' 4° and "societal and donee's personal
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.02(F) (LexisNexis 2002). This author has found no cases testing
the limits of that Ohio statute.
35. Brief of Am. Ass'n of Tissue Banks et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15-16,
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1305), available at
http://www.unos.org/SharedContentDocuments/ColavitoAmicusBrief_and_Motion - AsFiled.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, Hospital Halts Organ Program: St. Vincent Center in L.A. Says a
Patient, 52nd on Liver Transplant List, Got Improper Priority and the Action was Covered Up, L.A.
TiMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at Al.
37. This Comment does not seek to promote a donee's cause of action over regulation of the organ
transplantation process. However, for directed donations, the costs of monitoring and regulating organ
donations in order to sanction improper physician behavior might be very expensive. A donee's cause of
action might be less expensive, because the donee's potential recovery would give her an incentive to
come forward when improper disposition occurs and so the state need not monitor each donation as
intensely. For organ donation through the national waiting list, however, this reasoning favoring a cause
of action does not apply. See infra Section II.D.
38. UAGA, prefatory note (1968) (amended 1987). Note, however, that such desires are nonbinding
when they contradict the explicit wishes of the donor. UAGA § 2(h) (1987); UAGA § 2(b) (1968);
Hartman, supra note 27, at 23.
39. UAGA, prefatory note (1968).
40. A living donor's wishes tend to be difficult to ascertain only when the donor is a minor or
incompetent. In those cases, a close relative of the donor, such as a parent, may be permitted to decide
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interest in effective organ use." In light of those competing interests, providing
a narrowly defined donee's cause of action seems superior to providing a
donor's cause of action.
B. The Donee's Greater Material Stake in the Organ Makes Her a Superior
Enforcer of the Donor's Wishes
When a donor or her agents specify a transplantation recipient, a donee's
cause of action against medical personnel for improper organ disposition is
likely to be a more effective way of enforcing the donor's or her agents' wishes
while protecting the donee's reliance interests in the organ. Unlike the donor,
the donee has great material stake in the organ's proper disposition. While the
donor may only suffer intangible emotional or dignitary harms by having her
wishes ignored, the donee suffers pecuniary harms including medical expenses
for prolonged treatment, lost wages due to that prolonged treatment, and lower
future wage potential due to ongoing illness.4 1 If the donee learns of the organ's
improper disposition after she has been prepared for or perhaps even begun
undergoing surgery, such as in Colavito,4 2 she may also suffer reliance-like
damages due to undergoing risky, painful, and expensive procedures without
the compensating benefit of the ultimate organ transplantation.
The donee's greater material stake makes her a better enforcer of the
donor's wishes for three reasons: First, the donee is more likely to sue because
she can expect greater monetary recovery. When a statute clearly provides a
donee's cause of action to recover her pecuniary damages due to the lost
chance of a fully functioning organ, she may recover more and with greater
likelihood than a donor suing for mere emotional distress. 43 Second, the donee
on the donor's behalf, so long as the donation is in the donor's best interest. See, e.g., Curran v. Bosze,
566 N.E.2d 1319, 1331 (Ill. 1990); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493,498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
41. For example, dialysis costs an average of $50,000 per year, and the average waiting time for a
kidney on the national waiting list is five years. See Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for
Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216, 216
(2003) (estimating the expected savings in medical care over twenty years from getting a kidney
transplant rather than having dialysis at $94,579); see also Andrew Kusiak et al., Predicting Survival
Time for Kidney Dialysis Patients: A Data Mining Approach, 35 COMPUTERS IN BIOLOGY & MED. 311,
312 (2005); Rebecca D. Williams, Living Day-to-Day with Kidney Dialysis, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb.
1998, available at http://www.fda.gov/FDAC/features/ 998/198_dial.html.
42. 356 F.Supp.2d 237, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that Colavito's preparation for surgery
included the administration of intravenous fluids).
43. Emotional distress damages are difficult to recover. See Diane L. Borden, Invisible Plaintiffs: A
Feminist Critique on the Rights of Private Individuals in the Wake of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 35
GONZ. L. REv. 291, 306 (2000) (explaining that proving intentional infliction of emotional distress poses
"tough demands"); Glen Donath, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1113, 1121 (1995) (noting that for negligent infliction of emotional distress, "[m]ost courts
require either an injury that caused the [emotional distress] or physical manifestation of the [emotional
distress] as a condition precedent to recovery"); Eugene Kontorovich, Comment, The Mitigation of
Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 491, 515 & n. 117 (2001) (reporting that statutory
damage limitations have become popular for nonpecuniary damages such as emotional distress,
particularly in the area of medical malpractice).
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is more likely to sue because her recovery will more appropriately vindicate her
claim. Because the donee's damages are pecuniary in nature, financial
remuneration is an appropriate substitute. In contrast, because the donor's
harms are intangible, she may not see financial compensation as worthwhile
enough to merit bringing suit. Third, a donee's cause of action creates a more
credible threat to pressure medical personnel into proper disposition when it is
still possible, because the performance the donee seeks would provide her with
material, financial benefits that are more fungible with the costs of a lawsuit.
Proper organ disposition would not provide any material benefit to the donor
that could offset the material costs of initiating a lawsuit, so medical personnel
are less likely to be pressured by a donor's threat of lawsuit than if the same
threat were made by a donee.
For cadaveric donors who cannot enforce their own wishes, providing the
donee with a cause of action may serve an especially important function:
ensuring the transplantation takes place. Five percent of Americans claim they
would be unlikely to donate a deceased family member's organs even if that
family member had explicitly expressed the wish to donate." This statistic
suggests that a substantial number of people would not sue to enforce their
family member's donation preference if it contradicted their own preferences.
This seems particularly true in light of the fact that legal enforcement poses
high litigation costs. Especially when the donor's family members do not
approve of the donor's wishes, "hospitals and doctors.., often fail to honor a
deceased's directions to donate. ' '45 In these cases, a donee's cause of action
could prove necessary for effectively enforcing the donor's wishes.
In other words, these arguments suggest that absent a donee's cause of
action, medical personnel may be insufficiently deterred from substituting their
own judgment and preferences for those of the donor.46 As a result, the
argument for an organ donee's cause of action is analogous to an argument
supporting an estate's ability to bring a survival claim; in both cases if the
substitute party is not granted a cause of action to bring suit, the defendant will
be insufficiently deterred from negligent or reckless behavior.
47
44. The American Public's Attitudes Toward Organ Donation and Transplantation,
http://www.transweb.org/reference/articles/gallup-survey/gallup-chap4.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2007).
45. Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Commentary, Using Reciprocity To Motivate Organ
Donations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 297 (2005).
46. One might argue that even with a donee's cause of action, medical personnel will be
insufficiently deterred because malpractice insurance covers the cost of their liability. But "[i]ndividual
physicians may now face higher premiums or even coverage rejection" if they commit malpractice.
ROBERT A. BERENSON ET AL., CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LIABILITY CRISIS MEETS MARKETS: STRESS IN UNEXPECTED PLACES (2003), available at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/605. Moreover, medical groups and hospitals pay higher
premiums if their members or employees commit malpractice. Id. Finally, hospitals that self-insure even
more directly suffer from their employees' claims experience. Id.
47. See Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d 243, 252 (N.J. 1999) (arguing that punitive damages should
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The reasoning behind providing a donee's cause of action is also analogous
to the reasoning underlying third-party beneficiary theory in contract.
According to that theory, which is "generally recognized in modem law, 48 A,
the promisee, and B, the promisor, may contract for B to provide a benefit to C,
the intended beneficiary. If B does not provide C with that benefit, C may
enforce B's duty by lawsuit.49 The principles underlying this theory are that
"parties to a contract have the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a
third person," 50 and for "grounds of simplicity and convenience of remedy the
beneficiary is allowed a direct action against the promisor." 51 In the case of
organ donation, a physician (promisor) enters an agreement with a donor
(promisee) to benefit the donee (intended beneficiary) by transferring the organ
to her. If the physician breaks her promise, the donee should have a direct cause
of action against her based on the same principles that support a direct cause of
action for a third-party beneficiary contract.
52
C. A Donee's Cause ofAction Might Encourage Organ Supply
Providing a donee's cause of action could also increase the organ supply.
Donors are more comfortable donating organs to familiars (family members or
close friends) than to strangers. 53 Because donors would prefer to specify their
recipients, they would likely be even more inclined to donate if they could be
sure their desires would be respected. The Second Circuit acknowledged as
survive the victim's death so that the "defendant should not be freed of responsibility for aggravated
conduct"); Ronen Avraham, Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law: Revisiting the Theoretical
Framework and the Empirical Evidence 114 n.282 (Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 03-001, 2003),
available at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/artl 1/ (arguing that marginal deterrence requires that
pain and suffering loss should survive the victim's death, so that it would not be cheaper to kill than to
injure).
48. Note, Intent and Benefit in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts: A Justification for Public Policy,
26 VA. L. REv. 778, 778 (1940).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
50. Id., cmt. bc.
51. Id., cmt. bc.
52. This contract theory is strongly analogous to the organ donation situation, so much so that one
might argue that it should govern the situation; namely, that courts should find a common law cause of
action for organ donees through third-party beneficiary theory. However, because the National Organ
Transplant Act forbids the exchange of organs for valuable consideration, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000), and
because many scholars worry about commodifying organs by subjecting them to property or contract
rhetoric, direct application of third-party beneficiary theory might be less wise than a statutorily created
cause of action. See infra Section II.D for further comparison between creating a statutory cause of
action and finding a common law property or contract right to the organ.
53. See Aaron Spital, Public Attitudes Toward Kidney Donation by Friends and Altruistic
Strangers in the United States, 71 TRANSPLANTATION 1061, 1062 (2001) (noting that Americans report
being more than three times as willing to donate a kidney to a close friend with renal failure than to a
stranger). In 2006, less than 1% of organ donations for transplantation were made to anonymous
recipients. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Living Donor Transplants by Donor
Relation, http://www.optn.org/data/ (follow "National Data" hyperlink; then select "Transplant" from
the Category drop-down menu; then follow "Living Donor Transplants by Donor Relation" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter OPTN, Living Donor Transplants by Donor Relation].
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much in Colavito, noting that without statutory rights preserving personal
preference and legal remedies to enforce them, families might refuse to donate
organs in the first place-as in Colavito, Debra Lucia testified that "if she
[knew she] could not have directed the second kidney to Colavito, she would
have buried it in the ground along with the rest of Mr. Lucia's body.
54
D. Need To Narrowly Define the Donee's Cause ofAction
The policy reasoning discussed in Sections II.B-C justifies only a narrowly
defined donee's cause of action. There are four ways in which the cause of
action may need to be constrained: first, the cause of action should exist only
against medical personnel assisting in the transplantation process, not against
the donor or her agents should they reconsider the choice to donate. Particularly
while the organ remains in the donor's body, threat of suit could exert
inappropriate coercive pressure on the donor to go through the risky and
invasive transplantation process. Second, the cause of action should be
confined to cases in which the organ was intended for transplantation, not
research. The arguments in Section II.B regarding the donee's greater material
stake apply with less force to donees receiving the organ for research purposes
because an organ's material value for research is less certain than for
transplantation. Third, the cause of action might be better confined to directed
donations and not extended to donations through the national organ waiting list.
Waiting list donations do not as strongly implicate specific donor wishes. The
procedure for determining the list's order is extremely complex, 55 and a donee
is unlikely to be aware if the organ she should have received went to someone
lower on the list. As a result, regulation seems a better form of oversight for
waiting list donations. Finally, the cause of action should be confined to a
statutory definition, rather than implied from common law property or contract
rights. Implying a cause of action from common law rights could upset those
who are hesitant to commodify or commercialize body parts.56 A statutory
54. 438 F.3d 214, 228 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Abby Harris Maharaj, A Pink Dot Saved My Life:
One Tragic Side-Effect of the St. Vincent Transplant Controversy Could be To Discourage People from
Donating Their Organs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at B19 (describing how one newspaper reader reacted
to hearing that an organ had been given to the wrong donee by declaring, "I'm not putting my pink dot
[designating organ donation] on my driver's license until [organ transplant centers] clean up their act").
55. See Organ Transplants.org, The Gift of a Lifetime: The Transplant Waiting List,
http://www.organtransplants.org/understanding/unos/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) ("General principles
such as a patient's medical urgency, blood, tissue and size match with the donor, time on the waiting list
and proximity to the donor, guide the distribution of organs.").
56. See TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96 (1986) (affirming that "society's
moral values militate against regarding the body as a commodity"); Cain, supra note 22, at 475
("[R]ecognizing property rights in human biological materials ... could lead to an increase in the
international market in human body parts and an exploitation of the poor."); MaryJoy Ballantyne, Note,
One Man's Trash is Another Man 's Treasure: Increasing Patient Autonomy Through a Limited Self-
Intellectual Property Right, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 567, 593 (2005) ("[T]reating the body as a
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cause of action might be more popular, being less likely to create unsavory
precedent for conceptualizing organs as commodities.
CONCLUSION
A. Liability Exceptions
Colavito illustrates the need for states to define liability exceptions to a
donee's cause of action. The first exception should afford "good faith"
immunity to medical personnel. Excessive liability could, if unchecked, deter
medical personnel from participating in organ transplantations.57 For the
donor's cause of action, the UAGA incorporated a good faith immunity
provision "to help increase the organ supply by encouraging medical
professionals to participate in the organ procurement process., 58 Such a
provision should be included with a donee's cause of action, such that medical
personnel would be accountable only when their actions go beyond negligence
into the realm of bad faith.
Additionally, Colavito raises the important issue of medical compatibility
of donated organs. For successful organ transplantation, the organ must be
compatible with the recipient on several dimensions, 59 but donated organs are
frequently incompatible. 60 The donee's body will reject an incompatible organ,
such that it cannot benefit her, and could even cause harm. 61 When the organ
would not benefit the donee, permitting doctors to allocate it to a different
individual would ensure that it is put to good use.
commodity is morally repugnant to the sanctity of personhood."); Nancy E. Field, Note, Evolving
Conceptualizations of Property: A Proposal To De-Commercialize the Value of Fetal Tissue, 99 YALE
L.J. 169, 171 (1989) ("The policy rationale behind [prohibiting organ sales is] ... that impoverished
individuals might be induced to sell their organs for profit.").
57. See Colavito, 438 F.3d at 228 ("Encouraging private lawsuits ... may over-deter doctors and
hospitals that need to act quickly to preserve life-saving organs."); Perry v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., Inc., 886 F.Supp. 1551, 1557 n.3 (D. Kan. 1995) ("Absent a provision which protects them from
liability for anything other than 'bad faith,' hospital personnel would likely avoid involvement in the
donation process in almost all cases.").
58. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., No. 106, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 3655, at *20 (N.Y.
Dec. 14, 2006).
59. Brief of Am. Ass'n of Tissue Banks et al., supra note 35, at 20 n.2 (listing blood type,
histocompatibility, and organ size as a few of the necessary dimensions of compatibility). Organs must
also be generally viable. See id.
60. See Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE
L.J. 1215, 1216 (2002); Brief of Am. Ass'n of Tissue Banks et al., supra note 35, at 13 ("In fact, from
2000 to 2005 in the designated service area for the New York Organ Donor Network, there were a total
of 147 directed donation requests that resulted in only 28 transplants into intended recipients due to
clinical compatibility factors.").
61. Emma Young, Healing Rays, NEW SCIENTIST, May 16, 2001, available at
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn739 (explaining that anti-rejection drugs "dampen[] the
patient's immune system and increase[] their risk of infection. In extreme cases, rejection can lead to
death.").
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Finally, states should provide liability exceptions for important state
interests. The UAGA and several cases suggest that a coroner should be exempt
from liability to the deceased or her agents if their preferred organ disposition
would interfere with an effective autopsy in cases of suspected homicide." The
same reasoning justifies a coroner's exemption from liability to a donee. Public
health concerns also justify precluding the donee's recovery of the organ or
corresponding damages. A number of diseases may be transmitted from donor
to donee along with the organ, physically harming the donee and risking
contagion to others. 63 The importance of preventing the spread of disease
necessitates a liability exemption for physicians who decline to transplant
diseased organs.64
B. Growing Importance of a Donee's Cause ofAction
Organ donations for transplantation are generally increasing and that trend
includes directed donations.65 Donors are now capable of donating organs or
parts thereof that were impossible to donate before, such as liver sections from
living patients.66 As living donation becomes even safer and public awareness
increases, the number of directed donations can be expected to grow. Paired
organ exchanges 68 comprise another growing source of directed donations.
69
The success of early paired exchanges 70 has led scholars and physicians to
62. UAGA prefatory note (1968) (amended 1987) (listing, as one of the interests underlying the
Act, "the need of autopsy to determine the cause of death when private legal rights are dependent upon
such cause"); Martin v. Kim, No. 2:03cv536, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20595, at *14 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 19,
2005); Huntly v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 280 P. 163, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929); Snyder v.
Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 342 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
63. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Katz, No. 2005-00217, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 358, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. July 14, 2006) (rare metastatic cancer transmitted by a liver donation); Lutz Fischer et al.,
Transmission of Malaria Tertiana by Multi-Organ Donation, 13 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 491, 491
(1999); B. J. Pereira et al., Transmission of Hepatitis C Virus by Organ Transplantation, 325 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 454, 467 (1991).
64. Medical personnel should not be held liable for complying with federal regulations that prohibit
the transplantation of diseased organs. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1270.2 1(h) (2007).
65. See OPTN, Living Donor Transplants by Donor Relation, supra note 53.
66. Gina Kolata, First U.S. Liver Transplant From Live Donor Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989,
at AI.
67. W. H. Marks et al., Organ Donation and Utilization, 1995-2004: Entering the Collaborative
Era, AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1101, 1108-09 (2006) (claiming that less invasive transplantation
surgery and greater public awareness of the need for kidneys increased the number of living kidney
donors).
68. See Faith McLellan, US Surgeons Do First "Triple-Swap" Kidney Transplantation, 362 THE
LANCET 456, 456 (2003); Alvin E. Roth et al., Kidney Exchange, 119 Q. J. ECON. 457, 459 (2004);
Associated Press, 5 Receive Kidneys in Marathon Organ Swap, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 20, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15817751/.
69. Press Release, Johns Hopkins Medical Institute, Hopkins Starts Paired Kidney Exchange
Program (Aug. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Hopkins Press Release], available at
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2001/august/010816.htm ("[P]aired exchanges could benefit
about 3% of patients on the national organ waiting list, yielding about 1,500 additional transplants.").
70. Robert A. Montgomery et al., Clinical Results From Transplanting Incompatible Live Kidney
Donor/Recipient Pairs Using Kidney Paired Donation, 294 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1655, 1661 (2005).
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promote their use. 71 These directed donations comprise situations meriting a
donee's cause of action, as described in Part 11.72
As a result of these trends in organ transplantation, a donee's cause of
action is increasingly relevant. As the number of directed donations rises, it
becomes even more important to ensure that organs are allocated as donors
specify, both to respect donor wishes and to sustain their willingness to donate.
Given the policy reasoning in Part II, a donee's cause of action is likely to be
more effective at enforcing proper organ disposition than a donor's cause of
action, and so states should consider statutorily creating a cause of action for
the donee. However, for reasons discussed in Part II and this Conclusion,
legislatures should narrowly define the cause of action, and provide certain
liability exceptions. In so doing, states can transform the troubling facts of
Colavito into a positive scheme that protects the interests of organ donors,
donees, and society in proper and effective organ transplantation.
71. See Phyllis Coleman, "Brother, Can You Spare a Liver?" Five Ways To Increase Organ
Donation, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996); Michael T. Morley, Note, Increasing the Supply of Organs
for Transplantation Through Paired Organ Exchanges, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 221, 223 (2003);
Susan Hankin Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1036-37
(1985); see also Hopkins Press Release, supra note 69 (explaining that a transplant center established a
formal paired kidney exchange program in 2001).
72. Some organ technology developments, such as transplantation of animal body parts or
mechanical organ prostheses, could slightly offset the growing need for a donee's cause of action.
However, these technologies are expensive and have lower success rates than human organ donation, so
they are unlikely to comprise many organ transplantations in the near future. See, e.g., MassGeneral
Hospital for Children, Organ Donation, http://www.massgeneral.org/children/adolescenthealth/articles/
aa.organ.donation.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) ("[T]he xenotransplantation [of animal body parts]
success rate has been dismal.").
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